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1. Introduction 
During the past fifty years, the idea has been frequently 
advanced of connections linking wholes and their parts, 
generating loops that tie together parts and wholes in such a way 
that the fragmentation of the whole always implies loss of 
information. To mention only some authors, Bateson, Capra, 
Hofstadter, Luhmann, Maturana, Rosen and Varela are advocates 
of this idea. These parts-whole connections form what we shall 
call ‘hierarchical loops’. When parts pertaining to a hierarchical 
loop are separated from their whole, they behave differently (and 
may have a different nature) from the way in which those same 
parts behave within their whole. 
Hierarchical loops must be carefully distinguished from 
horizontal loops. The latter are well-represented by feedback and 
autocatalytic cycles, where elements of the same kind interact with 
each other. Non-linear phenomena mostly rely on horizontal 
loops.  
Unfortunately, the above-mentioned scholars – with the 
remarkable exception of Rosen – do not usually distinguish as 
sharply as necessary between horizontal and hierarchical loops. 
This unfortunate state of affairs – quite typical, however, of 
newborn, still unfolding ideas – has contributed to obscuring the 
scientific importance of hierarchical loops. 
The present Quaderno focuses on Luhmann’s contribution to 
the theory of hierarchical loops, and the wholes to be analyzed are 
social systems. 
Before at least some of the details are presented, a preliminary 
outline of the underlying main problem addressed by Luhmann 
will be useful. The shortest answer to this problem – “How is a 
society at all possible?” – while correct, is nevertheless too short 
to be helpful. To give some exploitable benefit, this answer must 
be ‘unpacked’ to some extent. The following two pieces of 
information are helpful.  
First, Luhmann constantly developed his theories from within 
a systemic perspective. The above question should therefore be 
reformulated as “How are social systems at all possible?” This 
reformulation makes Luhmann’s basic question more determinate, 
because it explicitly refers to both the general categorical 
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framework to be exploited to provide an answer, namely general 
systems theory, and the specific types of systems that are under 
analysis: social systems.  
Second, while social systems raise many problems which 
warrant study, one of them is so central that its clarification is 
required if a reliable, robust theory of social systems is ever to be 
developed. This is the problem of the reproduction of a social 
system. ‘Reproduction’ here does not have the usual biological 
meaning of the generation of a new individual. Within the theory 
of social systems, reproduction should instead be understood as 
the capacity of the system to maintain its identity against the 
continuous flux of its members.  
Luhmann is understood better as soon as his theory is seen as 
a step within one of the main strands in the evolution of 
sociological thought. Social systems are systems able to outlive 
their members – new individuals are born, others die off, yet 
others move from one social system to another. All these 
modifications notwithstanding, social systems show some kind of 
stability which, for the most part, is independent of the continuous 
transformation of the underlying set of their members. As said, 
this problem is called the ‘reproduction’ of a social system.  
The most obvious answer to the problem of the reproduction 
of social systems has been provided by Pareto: the reproduction 
of a social system (its temporal continuity) is brought about by the 
reproduction of the individuals that happen to make up the 
system. As obvious as this answer appears, it nevertheless raises a 
problem. In fact, it was Parsons who realized that the 
reproduction of individuals cannot be assumed as a properly 
sociological category. While the reproduction of individuals can be 
seen as a socially conditioned problem as one wishes, it nevertheless 
remains an essentially biological affair. In order to avoid reducing 
social problems to biological problems, and in order to answer the 
question of the reproduction of a social system satisfactorily, one 
must find an authentically social type of reproduction. Parsons’ 
answer was that the reproduction of a social system is provided by 
the reproduction of its (social) roles, i.e. by the reproduction of 
the patterns of action that are typical of that system. The 
reproduction of a social system is therefore the higher-order 
outcome of the reproduction of roles (patterns of action). This 
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answer gives a much firmer basis to social theory. This is not the 
end of the story, however. Luhmann later came to realize that 
roles or patterns of action are themselves in need of a firm basis, 
because roles are implementations of perspective points, interests, 
values, and – more generally – of meanings. In its turn, the 
reproduction of roles implies the reproduction of their meanings. 
In short, the reproduction of a social system is grounded in the 
reproduction of meaning. 
The following points may clarify the discussion thus far: 
 
- The Pareto-Parsons-Luhmann series clearly shows an 
increasing transition towards higher levels of abstraction. In 
order to find better answers to earlier proposals, sociologists 
have had to delve into deeper and deeper waters. 
- The process of reproduction does not imply lack of variation. 
On the contrary, reproduction is precisely the process that 
allows the generation of bounded (and therefore, possibly 
viable) variations.  
- Parsons and Luhmann have detached the reproduction of 
social systems from their material bases. Both roles and 
meanings, indeed, are far from being material entities. 
 
The last remark requires a further comment: what these 
scholars have shown is that the reproduction of social systems is 
not governed by the reproduction of their underlying material 
bases. Needless to say, “not being governed” does not imply 
“being existentially independent”. Put otherwise, social systems do 
need a supporting material basis. However, the important result is 
that, once such a basis is somehow given, the reproduction of the 
higher system does follow its own relational laws. While neither 
Parsons nor Luhmann were able to deal with this major 
ontological problem, which can be properly articulated only within 
the framework provided by the theory of levels of reality [Poli 
2001; 2007], they nevertheless had the merit of both raising the 
problem and disentangling some of its intricacies. 
The units of meaning used by a social system for its 
reproduction are communications [Luhmann 1986]. Building on 
[Bühler 1934], Luhmann sees communication as essentially based 
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on information, utterance and understanding. Information is the 
selection of what has to be communicated; utterance is the ‘how’ 
of the communication; understanding refers to what the receiver 
grasps from the previous two aspects of a communication. In 
more traditional terms, the first two components of 
communication can be read as its content and form. The real 
novelty comes with the third component: the understanding, 
which implies that “not the speaker but the listener decides on the 
meaning of a message” [Baecker 2001, 66]. For Luhmann, none of 
the three components on its own is a communication. Only the 
three components together form a communication. From this it 
follows that a communication can never be attributed to any one 
individual [Seidl 2005, 29]. Communications – as Luhmann 
defines them – are from the very beginning social acts. Moreover, 
communications can be accepted or rejected. This further aspect, 
however, is already part of the next communication. 
Communications generate further communications, which 
generate still further ones. For Luhmann, a social system is the 
autopoietic system of communication, where communication is 
the unit of reproduction of a social system. 
The paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 sketch the 
evolution of systems theory and provide the basics of autopoiesis. 
Sections 4-7 present the aspects of Luhmann’s theory of social 
systems that are relevant to our discussion. Section 8 introduces 
Rosen’s (M,R)-systems. Sections 9-11 develop the theory of 
anticipatory systems and Section 12 briefly applies the theory to 
the problem of conflicts. Section 13 presents the idea of higher-
order complexity. Finally, Section 14 calls attention to some of the 
underlying philosophical problems, and Section 15 concludes with 
a structural comparison between Luhmann and Rosen. 
2. The Evolution of Systems Theory 
The evolution of systems theory can be read in different ways. 
Here I shall adopt a structural viewpoint according to which the 
evolution of systems theory exhibits three main phases of 
development. The first phase in the evolution of the theory of 
 11
systems depends heavily upon ideas developed within organic 
chemistry. Homeostasis in particular is the guiding idea: A system 
is a dynamic whole able to maintain its working conditions. In 
order to define a system, one needs (1) components, (2) mutual 
interactions; (3) the environment in which the system is situated, 
(4) a boundary distinguishing the system from its environment. 
The main intuition behind this first understanding of dynamic 
systems is well expressed by the following passage: 
 
The most general and fundamental property of a system is the 
interdependence of parts or variables. Interdependence consists in the 
existence of determinate relationships among the parts or variables as 
contrasted with randomness of variability. In other words, 
interdependence is order in the relationship among the components 
which enter into a system. This order must have a tendency to self-
maintenance, which is very generally expressed in the concept of 
equilibrium. It need not, however, be a static self-maintenance or a stable 
equilibrium. It may be an ordered process of change – a process 
following a determinate pattern rather than random variability relative to 
the starting point. This is called a moving equilibrium and is well 
exemplified by growth [Parsons 1951, 107]. 
 
The main result achieved by the first phase of development of 
system theory has been the proof that the system as a whole is 
defined by properties not pertaining to any of its parts – a patently non-
reductionist view. Global equilibrium, say, is a property of the whole 
system, not of its parts. 
The definition of a system as the whole resulting from the 
interactions among its components, however, contains a number 
of hidden assumptions. Subsequent developments of system 
theory have sought to address and understand these hidden 
assumptions. There follow the main assumptions hidden within 
the initial definition of a system: 
 
- The first assumption is that all the system’s components are 
given in advance, before its constitution. The underlying idea is 
that the system collects and organizes elements that are already 
there. We shall discuss this problem under the heading of the 
system’s constitution. 
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- The second assumption places all changes on the side of the 
environment. What about systems able to learn and to develop 
new strategies with which to cope better with survival or other 
problems they may encounter? Systems endowed with this 
property will be called adaptive.  
- The third assumption becomes explicit as soon as the problem 
of the historical continuity of the system through time is 
addressed. What happens when a new component enters the 
system or is generated internally? What happens when a 
component is no longer part of the system, or dies out? As we 
have already seen, this group of questions can be summarized 
as the problem of the reproduction of the system. 
 
The overall outcome of constitution, adaptation and 
reproduction is complexity, although this of a type rather different 
from any of the mainstream conceptualizations of complexity 
[Poli 2009].  
The first two assumptions have produced an extensive body of 
literature, whose main results can be summarized by 
distinguishing two different types of both constitution and 
adaptation. The two forms of constitution are the bottom-up type of 
constitution from components of the system (that are already 
available), and the top-down constitution from (a previous stage of) 
the system into its components. This latter form of constitution 
again assumes two guises: as constraints on initial conditions and 
the phase space of the system components, and as the 
development of a new organizational layer of the system. 
In their turn, organizational layers are a structural condition 
needed by developing adaptive systems. In fact, an adaptive 
system needs both (1) rules governing the system’s interactions 
with its environment and with other systems, and (2) a higher-
order layer that can change such rules of interaction. These 
changes may be purely random, or they may follow pre-
established, or acquired, patterns. In this regard, a hypothesis can 
be advanced which claims that the main difference between non-
living natural systems on the one hand, and living natural systems, 
psychological systems and social systems on the other, is that the 
former have only one single organizational layer of interactions; 
the latter, more complex, systems have at least two layers of 
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organization: the one governing interactions and the one capable 
of modifying the rules of interaction.  
Furthermore, the persistence over time of living systems is 
made possible by multi-stability – a form of dynamic stability to 
perturbations that prevents the destabilization and rapid 
disappearance of such systems.  
The third of the three above-mentioned assumptions is the 
most important one. Indeed, the unfolding of the third hidden 
assumption – the problem of the system’s reproduction over time 
– has dramatically modified the entire landscape of system theory. 
The theory of autopoietic systems is possibly the best-known 
result connected with the problem of systems’ reproduction. In 
this regard, it is worth considering that the theory of autopoietic 
systems is itself in need of further generalizations. The simplest 
generalization of these is well represented by Niklas Luhmann’s 
theory of social systems. The second possibility is well represented 
by Robert Rosen, who some twenty years before the birth of the 
theory of autopoietic systems proposed what he called (M,R)-
systems (from Metabolism and Repair), which subsequently 
developed into the theory of anticipatory systems [Rosen 1985]. 
As it results, Rosen’s theory is both more general and more 
precise than the theory of autopoietic systems. In what follows, 
after a short description of autopoietic systems, I shall first sketch 
some aspects of Luhmann’s theory of social systems and then 
present Rosen’s proposal. 
3. Autopoietic Systems 
Autopoiesis is the capacity of a system to reproduce the 
components of which it is composed. A multicellular organism 
thus generates and regenerates the very cells of which it is 
composed; a unicellular organism generates and regenerates the 
components of the cell [Maturana & Varela 1980], [Maturana 
1981]. 
Autopoiesis dramatically modifies systems theory. An 
autopoietic system does not start from pre-given elements, neither 
does it assemble them. Furthermore, autopoiesis does not come in 
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degrees: either a system is autopoietic or it is not (in due time we 
will see why this is so). For an autopoietic system, the classic 
distinctions between system and environment and between closed 
and open systems acquire a new valence. Autopoietic systems are 
self-referential systems, meaning that the system’s relational self-
production governs the system’s capacity to have contacts with its 
environment. Put otherwise, the system’s connection with its 
environment is no longer a kind of immediate and direct relation 
between the system and its environment but becomes a reflexive 
relation, mediated by the self-referential loops that constitute the 
system itself.  
As far as autopoietic or self-referential systems are concerned, 
the guiding relation is no longer the “system ↔ environment” 
duality, but the “system ↔ system” intra-relations, or 
automorphisms. For autopoietic systems, the classic difference 
between open and closed systems – where open means that the 
system’s boundary is porous and lets both the system and its 
environment exchange matter and energy – acquires a new and 
different meaning: while openness maintains the previous meaning 
of exchange with the environment, closure now means the 
generation of structure, understood as the set of constraints 
governing the system’s internal processes. Closure (or structure), 
then, organizes the system as a holon, or integral whole. The 
guiding connection changes from the system-environment 
connection to that between the system and its own complexity, 
understood as the system’s capacity to adjust its own functional 
organization and internal structure.  
4. Luhmann’s Theory of Social Systems 
Luhmann generalizes the theory of autopoietic systems to 
psychological and social systems. According to Luhmann, both 
psychological and social systems are autopoietic systems, i.e. both 
are dynamic, autonomous, self-referential systems able to produce 
their own elements. To tell the truth, Luhmann says very little 
about psychological systems and focuses almost all his efforts on 
the understanding of social systems.  
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We have already seen that Luhmann is better understood as 
contributing to an already ongoing strand of sociological thought. 
Taken at its face value, the Pareto-Parsons-Luhmann connection 
shows the evolution, internal to sociological theory, of the 
problem of the reproduction of social systems. To repeat: 
according to Pareto the temporal continuity of a social system (its 
reproduction) is based on the (biological) reproduction of the 
individuals that make up the system; Parsons moved to a properly 
social kind of reproduction and claimed that the reproduction of a 
social system is provided by the reproduction of its (social) roles 
(patterns of action); finally, Luhmann noted that the reproduction 
of the roles that structure a social system requires the 
reproduction or reconstitution of the meanings attached to those 
roles. 
Apart from the evident increase of the level of abstraction 
shown by the three theories, quite a few substantial consequences 
derive from them. Here are some of the most apparent. 
The three mentioned theories are more and more dynamically 
flexible. Biological reproduction presents such an overtly slow 
pace of change that we can leave it aside. More interesting are the 
other two cases. The social reproduction of roles, in fact, exhibits 
a pace of change remarkably faster than the pace of the biological 
reproduction of individuals. Parsons notes that roles form a 
system of roles in which they interact with each other. What is 
reproduced, therefore, is the system of roles and their mutual 
dependencies. Luhmann notes that Parsons’ reproduction of roles 
contains a hidden assumption, namely that the meanings of the 
roles remain the same. Provided that the roles’ meanings remain 
constant, the system of roles and their dependences admits only 
limited variations. On the other hand, as soon as one accepts that 
meanings are themselves in need of being reproduced, the system 
acquires a further degree of flexibility. To provide an obvious 
exemplification, consider family roles over the past few decades. 
According to Parsons, there is only a limited number of ways in 
which family roles can constitute the viable, stable subsystem 
‘family’, and in which this subsystem can interact in a viable way 
with other social subsystems. By adding the layer of roles’ 
meanings, Luhmann makes explicit the fact that the specific 
meanings of, say, being a father or mother change and these 
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changes add new variations to the way in which family roles make 
up the system ‘family’.  
The second important outcome arising from the series of the 
three theories we are considering is connected to the question of 
the basic units of a social system. The question is: Of what is a 
social system made? Or: What are the elements that make up a 
social system? 
The question is much less trivial than appears. Pareto’s answer 
is the less surprising one: A social system is composed of 
individual human beings. Agents are the system’s units of 
reproduction.  
Parsons’ answer, instead, is that roles are the units of a social 
system, not agents. Luhmann continues along the path opened by 
Parsons by adding meanings as the units of reproduction of roles. 
To avoid mixing up different treads, it is mandatory to 
distinguish ‘society’ from ‘social system’. As Parsons explicitly 
says, 
 
a society is composed of human individuals, organisms; but a social 
system is not, and for a very important reason, namely, that the unit of a 
partial social system is a role and not the individual (from the discussion 
between Ruesch, Parsons and Rapoport, as reported by [Grinker 1956, 
328]. 
 
Note the explicit link between ‘society’ and ‘organisms’, which 
implies that ‘society’ is understood more as a biological than a 
sociological term. 
The proposals of Parsons and Luhmann represent substantial 
moves towards a dematerialization of social systems. According to 
both Parsons and Luhmann, social systems are non-material 
systems, they are relational systems over a material basis. Neither of 
them denies that an underlying material basis is needed. The real 
nature of a social system, however, is not conveyed by its material 
basis. There is no way to understand what distinguishes social 
systems from other kinds of systems by studying the biological 
entities that happen to bear them or the physical environment in 
which they happen to be embedded. This is not to deny that some 
information may derive from biology or physics. The thesis 
instead claims that what is specifically social of social systems does 
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not derive from other types of systems, biological or physical. In 
other words, social systems are higher-order systems organized in 
such a way that their reproduction is governed by the 
reproduction of properly social units and not by the reproduction 
of the units that characterize their underlying material bases. The 
reproduction of a social system requires authentically social units of 
reproduction. To repeat, this does not imply that social systems 
are entirely independent from their underlying material basis. They 
need a supporting material basis. However, the important result is 
that, once such a basis has somehow been given, the reproduction 
of the higher system does follow its own relational laws. Without 
this theoretical move, sociology cannot be constituted as a 
science. In the end, it is fair to acknowledge that neither Parsons 
nor Luhmann were able to spell out the details of this major 
ontological problem, for which the theory of levels of reality is 
needed [Poli 2001; 2007]. Occasionally, Luhmann himself speaks 
as if he were aware of such a theory, as when he notes that “by 
proceeding in the way he did, Parsons avoided every sort of 
reduction to levels of reality that do not consist in actions, such as 
material substrates or ideas” [Luhmann 1982, 49]. The evidence, 
however, is scant, and runs counter to Luhmann’s constant 
dismissal of what he calls the old ontological viewpoint. 
According to Luhmann, an ontological approach is based on a 
hierarchization of levels. Correct intuitions mix here with basic 
mistakes. That some ontological hierarchy is needed is not denied 
by Luhmann: a social system needs to be borne by some other 
kind of reality – surely by some biological kind of reality and 
perhaps even by some physical kind of reality. On the other hand, 
an ontological perspective does not have to claim that social 
systems must reproduce within themselves the same hierarchy 
that connects them to their bearers. As soon as the problem is 
reformulated in this way, its absurdity becomes apparent. 
Otherwise stated, there is no principled reason why a 
contemporary ontological framework could not accept both 
ontological hierarchies – such as the bearer/borne hierarchy 
between the material and the social levels of reality – and 
functional differentiation within a level of reality – such as the 
differentiation of the social level into its functional subsystems. I 
am perfectly aware that few contemporary proposals are 
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sufficiently flexible to accept so articulated a framework (which 
may become even more articulated when the psychological level 
of reality is included). On the other hand, the ontological 
framework that I have been developing during the past fifteen 
years does so [Poli 2001; 2006a; 2007]. 
I distinguish three main strata of reality (material, psychological 
and social) in such a way that (1) each of them is characterized by 
a different group of ontological categories; (2) they are connected 
by relations of existential dependence organized in a manner such 
that (i) the material stratum is the bearer of both the psychological 
and the social strata of reality, (ii) the psychological and the social 
strata jointly co-evolve from their material bearer, and (iii) they 
depend reciprocally on each other (all this is explicitly 
Luhmannian); (3) each stratum of reality presents its own internal 
organization. Interestingly, the material stratum presents a mainly 
hierarchical internal organization (well represented by the physics-
chemistry-biology series), while the social stratum – as we know it 
today – is based on an internal organization of a functional nature, 
and the psychological stratum presents a still different internal 
organization, somewhat intermediate between the hierarchical and 
functional organization of the other two strata of reality.  
A general ontological framework such as the one just sketched 
can clarify some difficult problems. To provide an 
exemplification, while I fully endorse the thesis that “in the 
relationship of emergence there is not more or less reality, not 
diminishing reality” [Luhmann 1995a, 111], I have doubts 
concerning the correctness of the immediately following sentence, 
“but rather variably selective connectivity. This is a matter of re-
establishing transparency despite opaque complexity, and that can 
only be attained as new levels of system formation emerge.” 
Leaving aside Luhmann’s understanding of complexity (on which 
see Section 8 below), what Luhmann says makes sense only from 
the point of view of social systems, that is, from the point of view of 
the strategies that a social system can implement to understand 
and eventually exploit its external environment (i.e. the levels of 
reality working as material bearers of the social system). On the 
other hand, the claim comes close to nonsense as far as the 
ontological connection between the social level and its material bearer 
is concerned.  
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Be that as it may, and with all the limitations we can ascribe to 
their theories, Parsons and Luhmann nevertheless had the merit –
beyond their explicit intentions – of raising the problem of the 
ontological autonomy of the social level from its material basis. 
5. Communication 
The units of meaning used by a social system for its 
reproduction are communications [Luhmann 1986, 174]. From 
[Bühler 1934] Luhmann derives the idea that communications are 
three-sided phenomena based on information, utterance and 
understanding. Information is the selection of what has to be 
communicated, utterance is the how of the communication, 
understanding refers to what the receiver grasps from the previous 
two aspects of a communication. As Baecker says, “not the 
speaker but the listener decides on the meaning of a message” 
[Baecker 2001, 66]. None of the three components on its own is a 
communication. Only the three components together form a 
communication, which implies that a communication can never be 
attributed to any one individual [Seidl 2005, 29]. Communications 
– as Luhmann defines them – are from the very beginning social 
acts, for the simple reason that an act of communication requires 
both a speaker and a listener. Communications come in series, one 
after the other, and form systems of communication.  
In Luhmann’s words: 
 
we can speak of a ‘social system’ whenever the actions of several 
persons are meaningfully interrelated and are thus, in their very 
interconnectedness, marked off from an environment. As soon as any 
communication whatsoever takes place among individuals, social systems 
emerge [Luhmann 1982, 70]. 
 
Communications generate further communications, and from 
these a social system emerges. When all communications end, 
when all the communications are rejected, the connected social 
system vanishes. The social system at large is the collection of all 
the ongoing communications. This is an autopoietic system that 
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maintains (reproduces) itself through the reproduction of units, 
namely communications.  
Having established that communications are the basic units of 
reproduction of social systems, the next step is to distinguish 
specific, different types of communications. Different types of 
communications form different social subsystems within the 
overall, inclusive social system as a whole. Here Luhmann 
distinguishes two main cases. Face-to-face communications are 
the units for interactions, and decisions are those communications 
that operate as the units for organizations.  
To avoid misunderstandings between the social system as the 
inclusive whole containing all the ongoing communications and 
subsystems based on particular types of communication, the 
expression ‘societal system’ will refer only to the system of all the 
communications, while the expression ‘social system’ will be used 
generically and will be understood as denoting three different 
types of systems, namely interactions, organizations and societal 
systems. “This triadic distinction corresponds to the most 
important centers of gravity in current sociological research: the 
theory of face-to-face behavior or symbolically mediated 
interaction, the theory of organizations, and (admittedly only 
feebly developed) approaches to a theory of society” [Luhmann 
1982, 71]. 
Each type of social system has its own specific features. 
Interactions require the effective presence of the interacting 
agents, which should perceive each other. Only the agents that are 
present belong to the system of interactions. Interactions, 
furthermore, develop by focusing on one issue at a time. 
Participants may change focus, but they are nevertheless 
constrained to organize subjects of communication into a 
temporal series. 
The requirements of actual presence and thematic focus are 
strong constraints and they impose severe limitations on capacities 
for interaction. More complex issues require other systems of 
communication. Actual presence is the obvious requirement to be 
dropped. Communication should be also possible with those that 
are not face-to-face present. Organizations and societal systems 
can do this. 
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Organizations are those systems based on membership 
conditions. Joining and leaving organizations are conditioned 
procedures. Societal systems, finally, are more than the mere sum 
of communications. Aggregates of communications do not have 
the structure required for them to be systems. According to 
Luhmann, societal systems are social systems, which implies that 
they are autopoietic systems and need appropriate forms of 
reproduction. 
An important difference between interactions and 
organizations, on the one hand, and societal systems on the other 
is that interactions and organizations can always start and stop, 
begin and end, while societal systems – society – cannot stop. 
Society is the underlying, ongoing general social system within 
which all the other types of social system find their place.  
This raises difficult problems, both substantive and 
methodological. While interactions and organizations can be 
studied against the background of societal systems, what is the 
background against which one can study societal systems 
themselves?  
Before this problem is addressed, something more must be 
said about the internal organization of societies.  
6. Functional Subsystems 
Modern social systems are different from previous kinds of 
social system because they are functionally organized into 
subsystems (economy, policy, law, science, art, etc).  
All systems – according  to Luhmann – must possess the 
capacity to distinguish relevant from irrelevant communications. 
Apart from this basic capacity, functional subsystems are 
characterized by specific codes: legal subsystems organize 
communication along the legal/illegal opposition, political 
subsystems along the power/non-power opposition, scientific 
subsystem along the true/untrue opposition, etc. 
Each subsystem sees the other subsystems as components of 
its environment. Subsystems are not supposed to ‘understand’ 
each other, i.e. to share the same constitutive codes, the same 
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basic distinctions. Subsystems read whatever is deemed relevant of 
the whole social system iuxta propria principia, from their own 
viewpoint.  
Interaction between subsystems and face-to-face interactions 
share the same basic format of what Parsons called ‘double 
contingency’. I quote: “each actor is both acting agent and object 
both to himself and to others” and “as acting agent, he orients to 
himself and to others and, as object, has meaning to himself and 
to others, in all of the primary modes or aspects” [Parsons 1968, 
436]. From the point of view of functional subsystems, say A and 
B, double contingency means that (1) A understands B from the 
point of view of its own code and B understands A from the 
point of view of its own code; (2) A knows that B reads the 
actions of A from the point of view of the code of B and B knows 
that A reads the actions of B from the point of view of the code 
of A; (3) A takes its decisions knowing what is relevant to both A 
and B, and B takes its decisions knowing what is relevant to both 
A and B; (4) B is meaningful to A and A is meaningful to B. 
The first two components spell out the former part of the 
above quotation from Parsons; the last two components spell out 
a fragment of its latter part (I have not detailed the various 
components of the clause “all of the primary modes or aspects”, 
which refers to Parsons’ idea of action as a system of relations and 
not as an event). 
Apart from major subsystems – such as the political and legal 
ones – the second part of Parsons quote – the one specified by (3) 
and (4) – loses some of its force as soon as the subsystems are 
multiplied. When several different functional subsystems work in 
parallel, each of them tends to lose contact with the codes and 
internal relevancies of the other subsystems. One can describe the 
phenomenon by noting that functional subsystems, once 
constituted, tend to develop and maintain their own identities and 
working conditions independently of the other subsystems. This 
natural dynamic evolution of functional subsystems towards 
progressive independence and autonomization helps explain 
several aspects of the current social situation.  
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7. Autopoietic Social Systems 
Autopoietic social systems regulate the exchange with their 
environment. From the point of view of the theory of autopoietic 
systems, the environment is not itself a system. The environment 
does not send ‘signals’ or ‘inputs’ to the system; system and 
environment do not share a common code. What the 
environment can do is perturb the system. The environment may 
eventually “trigger internal processes, but cannot determine those 
processes” [Seidl 2005, 23]. The processes triggered by the 
environment follow their own internal dynamic laws and 
communicate only with other processes internal to the system. All 
communications take place within the system; there is no 
communicative exchange between the system and its 
environment. 
The relation linking a system to its environment is called 
structural coupling. Different systems may be related to each 
other in the form of a structural coupling whereby one of the 
systems becomes the environment of the other system. Eventually 
both systems can become each other’s environment.  
Whenever different systems are structurally coupled, the 
exchanges that occur between them take the form of 
perturbations. In this sense, the brain perturbs the mind (nerve 
impulses are not thoughts), social systems perturb psychological 
systems, and vice versa (communications are not thoughts), 
functionally different social subsystems perturb one another. 
As we have said, autopoietic systems do not communicate with 
their environment. What they can do is exploit the 
system/environment relation and reproduce the same distinction 
within the system. This re-entry of the system/environment 
distinction within the system is the source of the system’s 
structure. According to Luhmann, the possibility itself for a 
system to apply to itself the distinction between the system and its 
environment requires that the system be capable of observing 
itself.  
The observational re-entry that generates the structure of the 
system constitutes the second level (or cycle) of autopoietic 
reproduction.  
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The capacity of self observation can alternatively be described 
as the capacity to produce a description of oneself, or as the ability 
to follow a norm. An operational implementation of the last 
version could take the form of a regulatory mechanism able to 
restore the functioning of the system whenever it goes wrong.  
The claim that autopoietic social systems observe themselves 
raises a major problem. In the case of interactions and 
organizations, we can detect their unfolding. In both cases, acts of 
communication and decisions follow one another and form 
usually identifiable series of acts. We can understand interactions 
and organizations because they unfold against the background of 
the social system that includes them. Furthermore, both 
interactions and organization are patently able to observe 
themselves, either through the actors’ capacity to observe 
themselves and the ongoing communication or through the 
organization’s sense of identity and decision style. On the other 
hand, when the object of analysis is given by the social system as a 
whole, we have neither a background against which to place the 
social system nor suitable acts, observational data or identity 
conditions to exploit. Whatever it is that lets social systems 
maintain their working conditions, it is not directly visible. 
Luhmann may possibly be right in claiming that self-observation, 
or something similar, is needed. On the other hand, the question 
is this: How can this claim be proved? How can we prove 
something that is not visibly detectable? 
What we see and can study are both the micro-systems 
provided by interactions and organizations and the macro-systems 
represented by the various functional subsystems. None of these, 
however, is anything like an entire social system.  
These problems make explicit why theories of social systems 
are so scarce. Luhmann is possibly the scholar who has gone 
furthest along the route to an encompassing theory of social 
systems. I do not think it is unfair, however, to maintain that he 
has got no further than halfway.  
It is worth noting that the lack of a general theory of its 
reference object does not afflict sociology alone. Biology is in the 
same situation. Notwithstanding all the astonishing results that 
support contemporary biology, it does not have a theory of 
organisms. And cognitive science likewise: Whatever exciting 
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results mark its development, those working in the field do not 
have a shared theory about consciousness. The interesting fact is 
that biologists, cognitive scientists and sociologists are all 
collecting vast amounts of data and discovering many new truths 
literally without knowing what they are working on. 
This situation requires attention. Something deep seems at 
work here. I am not bold enough to claim that I have the solution 
and can explain what is going on in these different situations. For 
the time being, what I suggest is that serious consideration should 
be made of relational biology and in particular the ideas of the late 
Robert Rosen, who was a mathematical biologist with a systemic 
orientation. In this sense, he worked within the same framework 
as adopted by Maturana, Varela, Parsons and Luhmann. 
8. Rosen’s (M,R)-systems 
The starting point of Rosen’s theory was relational biology, as 
developed by [Rashevsky 1954]. The main idea behind relational 
biology is that organisms are something more than their material 
basis. As Rashevsky was wont to say, in order to understand 
organisms one should “throw away the matter and keep the 
underlying organization”. Matter, the physical basis of organisms, 
is simply immaterial to their nature as organisms. While neither 
Maturana nor Varela make reference to Rashevsky, autopoietic 
systems can be seen as possibly the simplest descriptive way to 
articulate relational biology. On the other hand, Robert Rosen's 
(M,R)-systems [Rosen 1958] are the simplest mathematical models 
mimicking autopoietic systems. In this regard, it is worth noting 
that Rosen’s proposal antedates Maturana’s by more than twenty 
years. 
Some of the subtleties of (M,R)-systems are spelled out by 
[Rosen 1972]. For an introduction, see [Louie 2008] and [Nadin 
2010a]. Deeper analyses have been conducted by [Louie & Kercel 
2007] (still accessible) and [Louie 2006] (hard). The most 
systematic treatment of Rosen’s systems is provided by [Louie 
2009]. General discussion of Rosen’s ideas is provided by the 
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collections [Baianu 2006], [Mikulecky 2007] and the special issue 
[What is Life?, 2008]. 
Omitting all the mathematical details (which, however, are far 
from being irrelevant), the main outcome arising from Rosen’s 
systems is that they provide a natural way to distinguish at least 
two main types of higher-order complexity. The guiding idea is 
that the main difference between mechanisms and organisms is 
that organisms, but not mechanisms, are closed to efficient 
causation. The claim of closure to efficient causation means that 
the processes are mutually entailed within a system more complex 
than a mechanism; they form hierarchical loops (also known as 
‘impredicatives’ – on the logical coherence of impredicatives see 
[Devlin 1991, 155-159]. The obvious next step is to distinguish 
between systems in which at least some of their internal processes 
are mutually entailed, on the one hand, and those systems in 
which all their internal processes are mutually entailed, on the 
other.  
To spell out these and related differences, I first distinguish 
between (1) systems based on some internal algorithmic 
machinery (simple and complex systems, including chaotic 
systems) and (2) systems based on internal dynamics comprising 
hierarchical loops. For obvious reasons, the latter systems cannot 
be based on algorithmic functions. I shall baptize them ‘higher-
order or super-complex systems’. In their turn, higher-order 
complex systems come in two forms, according to whether only 
some or all their internal functions are mutually entailed.  
The distinction between complex and super-complex systems 
come close to von Foster’s distinction between trivial and non-
trivial machines [von Foster 1984] cited by Luhmann himself, e.g. 
in his [Luhmann 1997, 362].  
To avoid misunderstandings, I use ‘complexity’ in whichever is 
the mainstream sense of the term, and I distinguish ‘complexity’ 
from ‘higher-order complexity’ according to whether maximal 
models of the former but not those of the latter are 
algorithmically implementable. Less cryptically, complex 
phenomena are fully codifiable by models based on some 
algorithmic machinery, while the claim is advanced that no models 
based on algorithmic machineries are in principle able to 
completely capture super or higher-order complex phenomena 
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(for the mathematical details see [Louie 2009]). The present use of 
complexity (and higher-order complexity) is patently different 
from the concept of complexity used by Luhmann, who based it 
on the difference between system and environment (see e.g. 
[Luhmann 1995a], Chap. 5, Part II). From the point of view of 
Luhmann’s understanding of complexity, the title of this paper 
makes no sense – an explicit way to call attention to the fact that a 
different interpretation of complexity is at work. While the use of 
the same term for different meanings is unfortunate, the 
differences are so marked that no confusion is likely to arise.  
On the other hand, while the two theories of Luhmann and 
Rosen define complexity in remarkably different ways, they both 
share a major conclusion, namely that ‘complex’ systems 
irreducibly admit to different descriptions. From a Rosennean 
viewpoint, this conclusion is entailed by the lack of a maximal 
model for these systems (the validity of a maximal model implies 
that the model entirely captures the system – only machines 
(“trivial machines” as von Foster terms them) have maximal 
models). Luhmann’s viewpoint is more convoluted, and 
occasionally makes reference to Logfren’s idea of 
‘hypercomplexity’, as in [Luhmann 1995b, 176]  
Higher-order systems are not systems that are slightly more 
complex than ordinary complex systems. Complexity and super-
complexity are entirely different types of complexity. As Rosen 
himself says, “Just as ‘infinite’ is not just ‘big’ finite, impredicatives 
are not just big (complicated) predicatives”. In both cases there is 
no threshold to cross, in terms of how many repetitions of a rote 
operation such as ‘add one’ are required to carry one from one 
realm to the other, nor yet back again” [Rosen 2000, 44].  
Living systems are such that all their internal functions are 
mutually entailed. This also means that hierarchical loops do not 
have leading centers: any member of a hierarchical loop is implied 
by other members of the loop.  
This description of living systems fits well with Luhmann’s 
analysis of social systems. To repeat, all the subsystems of a social 
system are mutually related in such a way that modern social 
systems do not have any leading subsystem.  
The distinction introduced above between two kinds of 
higher-order complexity raises the problem of which of them is 
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more appropriate to society (and mind, one is tempted to add). 
Taking for granted that the complexity of social system is certainly 
not the complexity of mechanisms, it remains to be seen whether 
society presents the full complexity of a living system or the 
intermediate complexity characterized by loops linking only some 
of the system’s internal functions. The answer, however, appears 
straightforward: society as the overall system encompassing both 
all types of communication and all its functionally distinguished 
social subsystems cannot but include all its relational processes 
and their hierarchical loop. Sub-loops present themselves as 
natural candidates for specialized tasks, such as those performed 
by functional subsystems.  
The analyses so far presented suggest a general conclusion, 
namely that none of the encompassing general systems in which 
we may be interested (organism, mind, society) appear to be 
understandable by exploiting customary scientific methodologies. 
None of them can be fully captured by analyzing the parts of 
which they are made. For all of them something like a logic of the 
whole is at work. Admittedly, these are cases where most of us are 
at a loss. 
Luhmann had the merit of recognizing the problem and many 
of its subtleties. Rosen, however, did something more: he 
provided both (1) a deeper and clearer conceptual analysis of the 
intrinsic complexity of these systems and (2) a mathematical 
codification (which we have entirely skipped) for better delving 
into the intricacies of the arising, and often so awkward, 
problems.  
To further test the fruitfulness of the framework I have 
sketched, I now discuss a couple of further issues, namely the 
problem of anticipation or of those systems endowed with the 
capacity to make anticipations, and the role of anticipations in the 
case of conflicts. 
9. Anticipation 
What is anticipation? The short answer is: Anticipation is 
future-based information acting in the present situation. The 
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simplest way to understand anticipation is to think about the 
projects, plans and aims that persons may have. Occasionally 
some of these may even operate in an implicit way, i.e. below the 
threshold of consciousness. Social systems as well may comprise 
implicit forms of anticipation hidden in their internal loops. 
The somewhat longer answer states that anticipation has two 
aspects: (1) the system has an idea or model of its future 
development, and (2) it uses the information related to that idea 
or model to take its decisions in the present. If, according to the 
values accepted by the system, the model projects a positive 
evolution of the system, the system tries to realize the projected 
development; on the other hand, if the model projects a negative 
evolution of the system, the system may try to modify its 
trajectory [Poli 2010a]. 
Many more details need to be added to this first outline if a 
reasonable picture is to be developed. For instance, the system 
may know that it is heading towards a negative outcome, but it 
may feel unable to change its behavior, or it may reject the very 
idea of changing behavior. Or the anticipatory model may be 
wrong and may take for positive outcomes ones that in reality are 
negative, or the other way round.  
The first groundbreaking systematic study of anticipation has 
been [Rosen 1985]. After years of neglect, interest in his ideas is 
regaining momentum. For a survey, see [Poli 2010b] and the 
annotated bibliography [Nadin 2010b]. I shall focus only on the 
simplest aspects of anticipation, leaving further developments for 
other occasions. 
Anticipation comes in different guises. The main distinction is 
between explicit and implicit types of anticipation. Explicit types 
of anticipation can be used synonymously with prediction and/or 
expectation, while implicit types of anticipation are properties of 
the system intrinsic to its functioning. In this regard, we may ask 
whether we are “consciously creating anticipations on basis of 
which we plan and make decisions, or are anticipations and 
decisions making made for us?” [Riegler 2003, 11]. 
Secondly to be considered is the distinction between 
anticipation as a simple looking into the future and anticipation as 
the capacity to take account of the consequences of that looking, 
i.e. its impact on current behavior. This second distinction may 
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appear to be trivial, yet many conflicts spring from a kind of 
blindness to the consequences of the actions performed.  
The most efficient way to learn how to foresee each other’s 
reasons and actions is to devise forms of institutionalization of 
agents’ expectations. Institutionalization lowers uncertainty, and 
less uncertainty augments confidence. “Instead of getting 
overwhelmed by the details of a new situation, humans seek to 
replace them with familiar activity and behavioral patterns that 
show a high degree of predictability to putatively gain control 
again, to be able to anticipate the outcome” [Riegler 2003, 12]. 
The problem with institutionalization, however, is that it 
generates forms of blindness towards whatever does not match its 
internal codes. Institutionalized behavior may not be able to 
detect what futurists call ‘weak signals’, namely early and usually 
minor behavioral differences that may eventually grow and 
become new behavioral patterns.  
Furthermore, consideration should be made of the distinction 
between anticipation as a descriptive feature exhibited by some 
systems and the conditions that the system should possess in 
order to make anticipation possible (on the difference between 
anticipation as a descriptive feature and the conditions that make 
anticipation possible see [Poli 2010b]).  
Moreover, no description is able entirely to capture an 
anticipatory system. Side effects are structural features of 
anticipatory systems. By default, when the system carries out a 
particular activity, it uses only some of its internal resources 
(technically speaking, only some of its degrees of freedom; or only 
some of its functional subsystems are entitled to assume such 
activity). Side effects are due to the tension between the fact that 
the system’s dynamics characterize it as a whole (the equations of 
the system’s motion link all the variables defining the system) 
whilst the system’s functional activities require only some of its 
variables. 
The variables not involved in any particular functional activity 
are therefore free to interact with other systems in a non-
functional way, and even in a dysfunctional one (see the 
reconstruction in [Poli 2010a]. 
A major consequence is that activities will in general have 
effects on a system other than those which are planned. However, 
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there are often typical ways in which a system can go wrong. It 
may therefore be possible to develop diagnostic tools and devise 
appropriate responses.  
10. The Functional Structure of Anticipation  
The simplest scheme of an anticipatory system is shown by 
Figure 1 below, where an anticipatory system is composed of 
three parts: a normal (i.e. not anticipatory) system S, a model M of 
S, and a steering device D able to steer S according to the 
outcomes of M. 
The only internal condition is that the model should be able to 
run faster than the system itself. In this way the model can 
precalculate the evolution of the system S. Apparently, Luhmann’s 
reference to “the utilization of time differences” has some 
connections with the situation under discussion see [Luhmann 
1997, 364].  
 
FIG 1. The internal configuration of an anticipatory system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Provided that the entire system has the capacity to distinguish 
positive from negative states, when the model detects that the 
system is running towards a negative state, it may order the 
steering device to modify the system’s trajectory. If instead the 
System S
Steering Device D
Model M
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system is running towards a positive state, the model tells the 
steering device to maintain the system’s dynamic trajectory.  
This description of an anticipatory system is simple, but it is 
nevertheless helpful because it enables us to distinguish some of 
the typical ways in which an anticipatory system may fail. For 
instance, it may fail because the model is inadequate and needs 
updating, or it may fail because the steering device is unable to 
steer the system [Rosen 1974; Poli 2010a, b]. 
Anticipation can be understood at two different levels of 
abstraction. The simplest approach is to ask which types of 
controllers make anticipation possible. On considering the 
problem of the regulatory structure that a system may have, Rosen 
was able to distinguish different types of controller. In order of 
complexity, the various cases are the following: 
 
1. System with feedback controllers. 
2. System with feed-forward controllers. 
3. System with feedback controllers with memory. 
4. System with feedforward controllers with memory. 
 
Feedback controllers ‘perceive’ the system’s environment. The 
most important characteristic of feedback controllers is that they 
are special-purpose systems: for them, only highly selected aspects 
of the environment are relevant. Given some selected value, 
feedback controllers steer the system in order to force it to 
maintain that value. This is achieved by error signals indicating the 
difference between some fixed value and the actual value of the 
selected environmental variable. Within limits, the controllers in 
this family neutralize environmental variations and are able to 
keep the system stable. Their main limitation is due to the delay 
between environmental change and system adjustment: if the 
changes in the environment happen too rapidly (the exact 
meaning of ‘too rapidly’ depends on the type and sensitivity of the 
controller) the controller ends up by tracking fluctuations and 
rapidly loses its capacity to steer the system.  
Unlike feedback controllers, feedforward ones ‘perceive’ the 
controlled system, not the environment. The simplest way to 
imagine a feedforward controller is to think of a model of the 
system as in Figure 1 above. In other words, a material system 
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with a feedforward controller is a system containing a material 
model of itself. In order to behave as a feedforward controller, the 
model should run at a velocity faster than the velocity of the 
system. In this way the model anticipates the possible future state 
of the system.  
The third class of controllers comprises feedback controllers 
with memory. If a feedback controller is able to leave a trace of 
the system’s experience, this memory trace can be used to tune the 
system’s behavior better. A system with this capacity is obviously 
able to learn from its past experience. 
The next class of controllers consists of feedforward 
controllers with memory. As in the previous case, systems of this 
type can learn from their past experience. Rosen notes that 
systems of this type – “ironically”, he says – must use feedback 
controllers of type 1 for their operations. In fact, they must be 
able to work on deviations from predicted states (i.e., they need 
error signals, exactly like type 1 controllers).  
One may also consider the idea of general-purpose controllers. 
All the controllers discussed so far can be described as working on 
single types of ‘perceptions’ or variables. The obvious next step is 
to let systems behave in as articulated a way as possible (i.e., 
exploit as many variables as possible). The only constraints are 
given by the unavoidable need to use feedback controllers to 
modify the internal models of systems with this latter type of 
controllers [Rosen 1974; Poli 2010a].  
On a higher level of abstraction, one forgets all the details 
concerning the nature of the controllers and considers only the 
functional connections internal to the system. What emerges in 
this case is that an anticipatory system presents hierarchical loops 
among the underlying system S, the model M and the steering 
device D. This implies that all the relevant information is 
generated internally to the system. The environment may 
eventually act on the system as a trigger for actions, not as a 
source of information [Luhmann 1995a]. Hierarchical loops (or 
impredicativities as they are called in logic) mean that the system 
generates its own meanings internally. An anticipatory system is a 
system able to generate its own behavioral codes, and the formal 
side of this capacity is provided by hierarchical loops. 
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Those systems that are capable of observing their own 
behavior can use this information to generate new structure. This 
is done by adding self-observations to the hierarchical S-M-D 
cycle. The observational re-entry that generates structure 
constitutes the second level (or cycle) of autopoietic reproduction 
of an anticipatory system [Poli 2009].  
11. Do Anticipations Change? 
A system’s schemata determine how it looks at the environment. 
They are therefore anticipatory. Schemata construct anticipations 
of what to expect, and thus enable the system to actually perceive the 
expected information. Construction imposes anticipations and 
poses the question of how to construct. 
Most anticipations work as acquired habits either through 
evolution (as in biological anticipation) or learning (as in most 
cases of psychological and social anticipation). Evolution-based 
anticipations are difficult to change, for obvious reasons. 
However, as difficult as they are to change, they may evolve, and 
this raises the question as to whether we can eventually bend 
evolution in some or other direction. 
According to the theory of anticipation, behavior is almost 
always goal-oriented rather than being stimulus-driven. Anticipation 
runs contrary to the claim that psychic processes in general are 
determined by stimuli (i.e. it is at odds with both Behaviorism and 
most of current Cognitive Psychology) (for some data see [Poli 
2010b]). 
If behavior is indeed goal-oriented, this implies that changes in 
behavior are filtered by the system’s identity (seen as the second 
entry in the system’s autopoietic cycles). The reason for this is 
straightforward. Anticipation is based on feedforward controllers, 
i.e. on controllers that detect and control the system itself. 
Changes in the system’s working (i.e. in its identity) are therefore 
projected by feedforward controllers into new anticipations. From 
this basic dynamic of the system it follows that the most 
productive strategy to change the anticipations that a system may 
have is to modify the system’s dynamic identity.  
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Anticipation works at many different levels (and sublevels). 
The least we can assume is that there are biological anticipations, 
psychological anticipations and social anticipations. As far as 
conflicts are concerned, the most relevant types of anticipation are 
obviously the psychological and social ones. 
From what we have seen, it is evident that most anticipations 
work silently: they constrain the system’s behavior without the 
system being aware of them. Given the connection between 
anticipation and identity sketched above, this implies that the 
system knows only some fragments of its own identity.  
The main problem with such an extensive family of 
anticipations is that the different types of anticipation may work 
together and synthetically produce the system’s general 
anticipatory patterns, or they may conflict and eventually cancel 
each other out. Very little is known about these processes, and I 
am forced to leave their analysis for another occasion. 
12. Conflicts 
The connection between anticipation and conflicts has been 
well known since the early days of conflict studies. In fact, the 
difference between defensive and aggressive conflicts is often 
articulated in terms of anticipations, as shown by the way in which 
the basic types of conflicts are usually defined: 
 
- Defensive conflict = when the initiating contendant tries to avoid 
an anticipated loss.  
- Aggressive conflict = when the initiating contendant tries to 
acquire an anticipated gain. 
 
Furthermore, it is often assumed that power is a scarce 
resource, i.e. that “what he loses, I gain”. If power is indeed a 
scarce resource, the obvious consequence is that contendants will 
try anything to acquire more of it.  
To date, conflict studies have taken it for granted that the idea 
of anticipation is sufficiently clear and does not require further 
analysis. We have seen, however, that anticipation is far from 
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being properly understood and presents unsuspected complexities. 
Indeed, the theory of anticipation has many surprises in store. 
Conflicts, as based on anticipations, embody people’s habits, 
dispositions, tendencies, and attitudes – and none of these are well 
understood, to say the least. Much more is involved, however, for 
systems which are able to anticipate behave in a much more 
sophisticated way than systems without such a capacity. 
If it is true that anticipations essentially depend on hierarchical 
loops, no complete algorithmic model of anticipatory systems will 
ever be developed. What we may eventually be able to develop are 
sets of partial models addressing different aspects of a given 
anticipatory system. 
While some of these models may represent observables and 
the procedures for dealing with them (e.g. conflict management 
procedures), other models should try to represent the system’s 
latents. Since anticipations may be at work behind manifest 
behavior, we should find ways to map reality not as something 
entirely manifest but as a field of dispositions and powers, i.e. as a 
field of possibilities or latents.  
The most general way to make latents visible is to change the 
system’s boundaries. The simplest strategy is to embed the system 
within a larger context or system. In fact, most systems change 
their dynamic patterns when embedded within larger systems. 
Inducing new dynamic patterns via embeddings within larger 
systems is usually less difficult than trying to change the system’s 
dynamics in a direct way. 
When embedding into larger systems proves not to be a viable 
strategy, the opposite strategy of segmenting the original system 
into smaller systems can be tried. 
For those cases in which none of the usual strategies work, one 
may try to induce (controlled) dynamic dissonances into the 
system. This is a potentially dangerous option, because it may 
definitively ruin the system. However, there may be cases in which 
the induction of dissonances is the only option available. The 
presence of internal dissonances forces the system to reconsider 
its dynamic identity and eventually change its guiding patterns, e.g. 
by reconfiguring what it considers to be good and bad.  
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13. Systems of Higher-order Complexity 
Although widely incomplete, the theory of higher-order 
complexity paves the way for a new, deeply innovative, vision. 
Even if most details of this new vision are only starting to become 
dimly visible, some of its categorical requirements are nevertheless 
surfacing. In this section, I shall offer for discussion the idea that 
higher-order complexity requires at least four different categorical 
frameworks, namely those provided by the theories of levels of 
reality, chronotopoids, (generalized) interactions, and anticipation.  
Put briefly: 
 
- The theory of levels of reality provides the basic ontological 
framework for articulating the relations of dependence and 
autonomy between entities. See [Poli 2001] for a first 
introduction to the theory.  
- In its turn, the theory of levels paves the way for the claim that 
there may be different families of times and spaces, each with its 
own structure. The claim is that there are numerous types of 
real times and spaces endowed with structures that may differ 
greatly from each other. The qualifier ‘real’ is mandatory, since 
the problem is not the trivial one that different abstract 
theories of space and time can eventually be and have been 
constructed. I shall treat the general problem of space and time 
as a problem of chronotopoids (understood jointly, or separated 
into chronoids and topoids). The guiding intuition is that each 
stratum of reality comes equipped with its own family of 
chronotopoids (see [Poli 2007] for further details). 
- The theory of levels of reality also provides the natural 
framework in which to develop a full-fledged theory of causal 
dependences (interactions). As in the case of chronotopoids, 
the theory of levels of reality supports the hypothesis that any 
level has its own form of causality/interaction (or family of 
forms of causality/interaction). Material, psychological and 
social forms of causality/interaction may therefore be 
distinguished (and compared) in a principled way. Besides the 
usual kinds of basic causality between phenomena of the same 
nature, the theory of levels enables us to distinguish upward 
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and downward forms of causality/interaction (from the lower 
level to the upper one and vice versa).  
- An anticipatory system is a system such that the choice of the 
action to perform depends on the system’s anticipations of the 
evolution of itself and/or the environment in which it is 
situated; reactive systems, on the contrary, are such that 
subsequent states depend entirely on preceding states. 
Whatever organisms, minds and societies may be, I take it for 
granted that they cannot be understood as purely reactive 
systems. 
 
A couple of short addenda on anticipation are worth 
considering. First, given that anticipation requires only that the 
system contains a hierarchical loop including at least some of the 
system’s functions, also non-living systems can be anticipatory. 
Second, organisms, minds and society require the capacity to 
coordinate the rhythm of the overall system with those of its 
parts. These general systems are all multi-strata systems composed 
of different types of components interacting at different 
functional levels and at different levels of organization. While 
most details of these highly complex systems are still unknown, 
the possibility should be considered that the anticipatory 
capacities of the system as a whole may diverge from those of its 
subsystems. 
14. Latents and Other Philosophical Conundrums 
The cursory reference to latents in Section 12 above requires 
brief explanation. The only aspect that I need to touch upon is 
that reality comprises not only what is actually given but also 
dispositions, habits, tendencies, and the forces generating them. 
These are collectively called latents.  
Even if latents may not be actually detectable in any given 
situation, they may nevertheless be there. Latents may become 
actual if proper triggering conditions are in place, or they may be 
lost in the process. The simplest case of latents is given by 
dispositions, which can be described under the label “what would 
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happen if” (what would happen if sugar were added to a liquid, or 
if the country went to war). Occasionally, latents can be perceived 
even when they are not exercised. They form a kind of halo 
around persons and situations. Individual and group decisions can 
actually be based on the perception of latents. The lack of a 
general theory of latents, however, makes it difficult both to 
organize systematically the psychological and social data already 
available and to guide research towards a better understanding of 
the less known aspects of the systemic perception of latents. Be 
that as it may, a major difference between the behavior of people 
and the behavior of institutions is that the latter seem remarkably 
less able to perceive latents. This raises an interesting side to the 
problem of institutionalization, namely the passage from more 
flexible, generic structures to more constrained and more 
specialized ones. I am forced, however, to leave discussion of this 
issue to another occasion.  
The most relevant latents of interest here are provided by the 
hierarchical loops governing the general encompassing types of 
system – organism, mind and society. As we have seen, all them 
seem to be governed by normally undetectable hierarchical loops, 
which implies that they depend on the working presence of 
suitable latents. 
Some other comments on philosophical matters are needed. 
One of the main problems with Luhmann – but not with Rosen – 
is his rather idiosyncratic understanding of ontology. Apparently, 
Luhmann believes that ontology starts from a pre-given set of 
elements, and it studies the combination of those elements. As he 
repeatedly says, the unity of the system’s elements is not 
something that is ontologically given (e.g. [Luhmann 1995a] and 
elsewhere). I for one have no problem in accepting his claim. I 
think it is also important to note that, whilst some ontologists have 
indeed defended atomistic ontologies, almost all the great figures 
in ontology have defended much more sophisticated ontological 
frameworks. Indeed, the idea itself of focusing the analysis of the 
ontological import of the theory on the status of the system’s 
elements alone is patently too restrictive. The real issue, in fact, is 
not the ontological status of elements but the ontological status of 
the systems themselves, and in particular the ontological status of 
autopoietic systems. Provided that the theories partially discussed 
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in this paper are correct, the conclusion is straightforward: 
biological, psychological and social realities have the nature of 
autopoietic systems (eventually of generalized autopoietic 
systems). This is a major ontological claim, which gives us 
important insights into at least one of the major differences 
between physical and chemical systems, on the one hand, and 
biological, psychological and social systems on the other. 
Luhmann occasionally shows that he has some understanding of 
the problems that lie behind all these questions, for instance when 
he asserts that “autopoietic systems … do not create a material 
world of their own. They presuppose others levels of reality” 
[Luhmann 1986]. Even if this quotation is not entirely correct, 
because biological entities are material entities, it nevertheless 
moves in the right direction, namely the thesis that autopoietic 
systems are relational systems which can be realized by material 
systems. To repeat Rashevsky’s vivid dictum in a slightly modified 
version: in order to understand autopoietic systems, “throw away 
the matter and keep the underlying organization”. Clarifying the 
ontological nature of autopoieisis is one of the problems on the 
agenda of contemporary ontologists. 
The second problem to be mentioned is that there is no reason 
to identify the system’s composing elements with its units of 
reproduction. Many interesting wholes present both a material and 
a functional kinds of composition.    
The third problem is the connection between latents see [Poli 
2006b; 2009] and autopoietic systems. The shortest answer is that, 
from the point of view of elements (again!), many aspects of the 
systems of which they are parts are latent: systems constrain the 
behaviour of the elements without obviously being part of them. 
The fact that (at least some) elements may have been generated by 
the system makes the system’s latency even more interesting. It 
has been recently suggested that one of the consequences of the 
downward causation exerted by the system on its elements is non-
locality: “The causation is seemingly everywhere in the process 
and not localizable at any specific place”. A further consequence is 
the “inability to tease the causal links apart” [Kercel 2004, 15], a 
consequence explicitly discussed by [Rosen 1985]. 
Lastly, what is the complexity of self-reference? Needless to 
say, self-referential systems cannot be entirely based on rote, 
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algorithmic frameworks. Even if any of their states can obviously 
be simulated, self-referential systems, almost by definition, escape 
the possibilities of rote iteration. This argument only shows that 
the complexity of a self-referential system extends well beyond 
mainstream complexity theory. For this reason, the idea of 
systems of higher-order complexity has been introduced. As we 
have seen, these types of systems come in at least two forms: self-
referential (or impredicative) systems, and living systems. 
Anticipation is but one of the many intriguing features of self-
referential systems. Living systems are those self-referential 
systems in which all internal functional relations are entangled 
within one overall hierarchical loop. The really surprising outcome 
is that self-referentiality does not necessarily require life. Also 
non-living systems can be self-referential systems. However 
surprising, this conclusion is nevertheless most welcome because 
it shows that reality still has many surprises in store. 
15. From Luhmann to Rosen and Back 
Only the most general aspects of Luhmann and Rosen’s 
theories have been considered by this paper. Even at such an 
ethereal level of abstraction, however, it is apparent that their 
theories are closer to each other than one might think.  
I shall restrict my remarks only to the following two aspects. 
Luhmann states that “autopoiesis, as a concept, has no empirical 
explanatory value. Its potential lies rather in the fact that forces 
other concepts into adaptation” [Luhmann, “Organization und 
Entscheidung”, 2000], quoted by [Seidl & Becker 2005, 11]. As a 
matter of fact, Luhmann’s claim is overstated: almost all 
innovative frameworks require what may be a long period of 
maturation before they are ready for application. Be that as it may, 
both Luhmann and Rosen’s theories have been used to model 
real, empirical situations. From the point of view of Rosen, 
Luhmann’s lack of “empirical, explanatory value” assumes the 
form of the realization of (M,R)-systems. As Louie writes, 
“functional organization cuts across physical structures, and a 
physical structure is simultaneously involved in a variety of 
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functional activities” [Louie 2006, 36]. Hence there is no obvious 
translation (‘realization’) of an (M,R)-system into a biological 
individual. (M,R)-systems provide a conceptually very abstract 
framework in which to understand life.  
The realization of life into actual organisms requires many 
more details extending beyond (M,R)-systems. The same applies 
to Luhmann’ social system theory, which addresses only the most 
basic, the deepest, aspect of social systems. Many more details are 
needed in order to understand this or that concrete system. I for 
one fail to see why all this should be a problem. 
The second problem that I shall discuss concerns the question 
of the structure of an autopoietic system. I mentioned above that 
structure is related to the second autopoietic cycle of an 
autopoietic social system. From the point of view of Luhmann’s 
theory, the first autopoietic cycle realizes the constitution of the 
system, while the second cycle generates the system’s identity. 
Interestingly, Rosen also stresses that the minimal (M,R)-system is 
based on two relations, namely metabolism and repair. 
Metabolism is the basic activity that constitutes the system, 
repair is modification of the system’s dynamics according to some 
norm. Whenever the system’s dynamics (its metabolism) go awry, 
the repair component intervenes in order to reestablish order. 
Thirdly, according to Rosen’s distinction between self-
referential and living systems, Luhmann’s theory of social systems 
pertains to the latter class: it is the theory of a particular class of 
living systems. Within the said classification, the reference to self-
reference is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
characterizing social systems. 
If we resume the four types of controllers presented in section 
10 above, we can discover a further interesting subtlety. Let me 
first repeat the short description of the four controllers: 
 
1. System with feedback controllers. 
2. System with feed-forward controllers. 
3. System with feedback controllers with memory. 
4. System with feedforward controllers with memory. 
 
One of the underlying difficulties with Luhmann’s theories is 
that he uses only type 1 (and occasionally type 3) controllers in his 
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reflections. Luhmann apparently has no idea of controllers of type 
2 and 4. Even if Luhmann describes social structures as 
expectations [Luhmann 1995a], he apparently has no composite 
theory of anticipation. Rosen’s theory may then help to articulate 
Luhmann’s proposal by explicitly including feedforward structures 
in his framework.  
Finally, an overview of the foregoing discussion may help. 
Luhmann’s work can be broadly divided in two main phases. The 
first phase was mainly focused on the task of generalizing and 
giving a better grounding to Parsons’ theory of social systems. 
The development of the theory of autopoietic systems in the 
1980s triggered Luhmann’s second phase. The categorical 
framework provided by autopoiesis gave Luhmann the tools with 
which to further generalize and deepen his previous efforts. The 
theory of social systems developed by Luhmann thus represents a 
generalization of autopoiesis theory through its application to 
social phenomena. This paper has drawn attention to the fact that 
the theory of autopoietic systems can be reconstructed as a 
specific fragment of the more general theory of (M,R)-systems 
developed by Rosen. Luhmann’s generalization of autopoiesis still 
falls within the capacities of (M,R)-systems. The hypothesis has 
then been suggested that an explicit consideration of Rosen’s 
theory provides room for a further generalization of Luhmann’s 
theoretical framework. The intriguing phenomenon of 
anticipation and the problem of conflicts have been proposed as 
possible testing grounds to verify the fruitfulness of the 
generalization suggested. 
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